Working with virtual images
Working with virtual images
Compositor NRTOS consists of dumps from other devices. That is, these are all devices that are within the scope of the RAD96 microkernel. When other devices try to penetrate a device that patched with RAD96 microkernel, the cache of the penetrating device is dumped to the Compositor Software cloud server. Thus, Compositor NRTOS commits occur. There are two types of commits: recorded commits and cached commits, which are stored in the cloud. Compositor NRTOS recorded commits consist of 10171 MAC tables. Compositor NRTOS cached commits consist of an indefinite number of commits, but you can rate them from the Apple Watch cache, which is more than 3 GB. These are all devices that dump their cache to the Compositor cloud and were written as MAC tables in the MIB, so they take up less space than the recorded commits. These cached commits are not only downloaded to one non-root device on the Compositor network, i.e. Apple Watch, but are also stored in the iCloud, Google clouds and interact with the autonomous system. The microkernel itself does not contain an operating system. Thus, in order to use the Compositor NRTOS on the 3rd-party machine, you must run the Niagara dump. However, I cannot create dumps more often for economic reasons, and thus cached commits contain a newer operating system than the OS contained in the dump. The Compositor microkernel runs NRTOS in virtual images. The content and placement of such an image should remain unknown for cybersecurity reasons. Therefore, whenever you are asked to reveal the location of the image, you should know that it is a scammer. And when a third-party device penetrates the image, the microkernel dumps the scammer’s operating system as a commit to the servers. Thus, I am working on applying patches, the main one of which is to hide the work of Compositor NRTOS in the operating system image. I am working on encryption schemes to make such images more reliable and inaccessible to third parties. I’m working on Compositor NRTOS by committing after the system is penetrating. However, I do not have records of penetration into the Compositor microkernel itself, as such attempts are inappropriate due to the full cycle of development of this architecture. And, thus, it remains impossible to penetrate the Compositor microkernel, as it is designed to the level of an autonomous system and contains all the patches found in such operating systems. The main weakness is the Compositor NRTOS itself, because it is an additive dump of all penetrating systems.
